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require the defendant to testify. 12 Instead, the Court noted that the
prosecution would have been content with testimony by acquaintances
of the defendant. 13 Finally, the Court addressed charges from the dissent
that the holding weakened the presumption of innocence: "Once the
defendant has been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial the
14
presumption of innocence disappears."
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The United States Supreme Court held in Lashley that, even
assuming the application of the presumption of innocence at a capital
penalty trial, defendants are not entitled to an instruction to any greater
degree than those that have not yet been convicted. Referring to the guilt/
innocence portion of the trial, the Court ruled that "[u]nder our precedents, the instruction would have been constitutionally required only if
the circumstances created a genuine risk that the jury would conclude,
from factors other than the state's evidence, that the defendant had
15
committed other crimes."
The fact that the defendant does not have a criminal history is a
6
statutory mitigating factor under both Missouri and Virginia law.t
Missouri, however, places the burden of proof on the defendant as to the

12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1226.
15 Id. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786,788-89 (1979).
16 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.3(1) (Vernon 1979) (current version Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 565.032.2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993)); Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(i) (1990).

existence of this mitigating factor. It is also worth noting that, while
juries cannot be limited to consideration of only statutorily enumerated
mitigating factors, instructions should be requested to the effect that the
Virginia legislature has highlighted a certain element such as a lack of
criminal history as mitigating. 17 Itis not irrational to argue thatLashley's
holding (that no instruction is required in the absence ofevidence) means
that an instruction is required when the evidence exists.
AfterLashley, it is clear that an attorney may be forced to prove that
something did not happen. Virginia law permits counsel to offer proof
by use of any form of admissible evidence. 18 In a similar situation to
Lashley's, a defense attorney could ask the Commonwealth's attorney to
stipulate to the lack of criminal history. If the Commonwealth's attorney
refuses, the defense attorney may then subpoena the custodians of the
records in every jurisdiction where the defendant has resided in order to
prove the necessary elements.
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Turner

17 These elements are found in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)
(1990).
18 In Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,436-37,304 S.E.2d
271,278 (1983), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, once the trial
court deemed the evidence (photographs of the deceased) admissible, the
defense could not preclude use ofthe pictures by offering to stipulate that
the victim had been murdered in the way that the prosecution claimed;
therefore, the prosecution had the right to offer the photographs.

SULLIVAN v. LOUISIANA
113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS

HOLDING

The Louisiana Criminal District Court, Parish ofOrleans, convicted
John Sullivan of first-degree murder in the course of committing an
armed robbery and sentenced him to death. Michael Hillhouse, a
convicted felon and his alleged accomplice, identified Sullivan at trial as
the murderer. Hillhouse testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. Of the
many people at the bar during the crime, only one - who had not been
able to identify Hillhouse or Sullivan at a lineup - testified that the two
had committed the robbery and that she had seen Sullivan hold a gun to
the victim's head. Other circumstantial evidence tended to show that
Sullivan had been the triggerman. Defense counsel argued that there was
reasonable doubt concerning both the murderer's identity and intent.
In instructing the jury, the trial judge defined "reasonable doubt" in
a way that was, as the State conceded, essentially identical to the
definition found unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana.1 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana held on direct appeal that the erroneous instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The United States Supreme
Court granted Sullivan's petition for certiorari.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction cannot be
harmless error. 3 The Court based its holding on two settled principles.
First, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury is fundamental. Its
most important element is the right to have the jury, not the judge, find
guilt.4 Second, the Due Process Clause requires that the prosecution bear
the burden of proving all elements of the offense and the facts necessary
5
to establish each element "beyond a reasonable doubt."

1 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). The instruction in Cage said in
part: "It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty,
... It is an actual substantial doubt. ...What is required is not an
absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty." Id. at40. See

case summary of Cage,Capital DefenseDigest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 5 (1991).
2 State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177, 186 (La. 1992).
3 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993).
4 Id. at 2080.
5 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-364 (1970)).

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to have a
jury find the defendant guilty is interrelated with the Due Process
requirement ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sixth Amendment
would be violated if ajudge were allowed to determine that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after the jury had determined only
that he was probably guilty. The instruction given to the Sullivan jury
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did not produce ajury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It was,
therefore, constitutionally deficient; it denied Sullivan his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
6
All constitutional errors do not, however, require reversal. In
concluding that a Sullivan-type error is not amenable to harmless-error
analysis, the Court distinguished a situation such as that found in
Sandstrom v. Montana.7 The Sandstrom trial court - at the request of
the state and over the objection ofthe defendant -instructed thejury that
"It~he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that the instruction was unconstitutional because the jury might have
interpreted the presumption as being conclusive, oras shifting the burden
of persuasion, and either interpretation would have violated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of
a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The Sullivan court
explained that when the jury is instructed to presume an element of the
offense, it must still make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
facts upon which the presumption is based. Therefore, if the predicate
facts are closely related to the presumed fact, and no reasonable juror
could find one without finding the other, the court may be able to
conclude that the presumption did not influence the jury's findings.10
The Sullivan court further articulated a standard for determining
whether constitutional errors are indeed harmless: "The inquiry ... is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
I
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.", l Because
in the Sullivan case there was in effect no jury verdict of guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, there can be no meaningful question of whether the
same verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would have been
rendered without the constitutional error.

6 Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that even
errors ofconstitutional magnitude may be harmless, but that a reviewing
court must consider the error's actual effect on the jury verdict to
determine whether it was harmless).
7 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
8 Id. at 512.
9 Id. at 514-527.
10 Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082.
11 Id. at2081.
12 See Strawdernianv. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 855, 108 S.E.2d
376 (1959), and Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 156 S.E. 577
(1931). See also McCoy v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 731, 112 S.E. 704
(1922); Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123,340 S.E.2d 828 (1986);
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 497, 345 S.E.2d 775 (1986).
13 The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse offers the following
instruction as a guideline:

Sullivan should not present many issues for Virginia practitioners.
Virginia's Model Jury Instructions which deal with capital murder,
instructions 34.100 and 34.120, each mention "prove beyond a reasonable doubt" three times, but do not attempt to define the term. Instruction
2.100 however, entitled "Reasonable Doubt and Presumption of Innocence," makes a cursory attempt at a definition: "A reasonable doubt is
a doubt based upon your sound judgment after a full and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case." The Supreme Court of
Virginia has discouraged attempts at reducing or defining what reasonable doubt is any further. The court has wisely warned that attempting
to do so tends to cloud rather than clarify the issue. 12 Since there is no
constitutional reason to expressly define such a term, and since Virginia
discourages such attempts at definition, a Sullivan error should not occur
here unless ajudge goes further than is customary. If it becomes an issue,
an objection can, and indeed should, be made to instructions that
resemble the ones given in Cage and Sullivan.
The reasonable doubt issue does suggest another possible issue,
however. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(C) requires the Commonwealth to prove the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can impose the death penalty. Without asking
for a definition of reasonable doubt, defense counsel should consider
requesting an instruction to the effect that the Commonwealth must erase
all reasonable doubt about the aggravating factors from the minds of the
jurors before they can impose death, as well as further instructions that
make the jury aware that there is in no instance a duty to sentence to death,
13
even if aggravating factors are found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl

Members ofthe jury, I will now instruct you on the manner
in which you are to consider the evidence that has been
presented in this sentencing proceeding.
Before you may fix the punishment of defendant at death,
you must find, unanimously andbeyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence of the aggravating circumstance(s) about which I
have previously instructed you.
In order to fix the punishment of defendant at life imprisonment, you are not required to reach a unanimous decision as
to the existence of any particular fact in mitigation. You are not
required to find any fact in mitigation beyond a reasonable
doubt.
I further instruct you that, under our law, you are permitted
to fix the punishment of defendant at life if you find that to be
the appropriate sentence, even if you find unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating
circumstance(s) about which I have previously instructed you.

MUELLER v. VIRGINIA
113 S. Ct. 1880 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Authorities arrested Everett Lee Mueller for the rape and murder of
ten-year old Charity Powers after her body was found in a shallow grave
near his home. The police advised the defendant of his Mirandarights
and he agreed to talk to authorities. At one point during the questioning
Mueller asked the detective, "[D]o you think I need an attorney here?"
The detective shook his head and shrugged. He then said, "[y]ou'rejust

talking to us." Shortly thereafter, Mueller confessed to the rape and
murder.
The defendant moved to suppress the confession, claiming it was
obtained in violation of Edwardsv. Arizona.1 The trial court denied the
1451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981) (holding that oncedefendant invokes
right to counsel, all police questioning must cease until counsel has been
provided).

